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INTRODUCTION 
 
After deregulation in the United States in 1978, airlines faced intense competition on previously 
regulated routes. The proponents of deregulation stated that equilibrium in the industry would be 
achieved by providing lower fares and improved service (Daraban and Fournier, 2008). While 
this became true to some extent, the airline network in the U.S. was dominated by the hub-and-
spoke system and concentrated in the hands of few large airlines. The emergence of the Low-
Cost Carrier (LCC) model, which originated in the U.S. through Southwest Airlines in the early 
1970s, became an instrument to drive the airlines towards a competitive equilibrium. The LCC 
model was later adapted by the European market with the Irish carrier Ryanair in 1991, followed 
by the U.K.-based easyJet in 1995.  
 
The airline industry is very volatile. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), which 
is an independent agency that works for U.S. Congress, reported that in 2008 the U.S. passenger 
airline industry lost $5.6 billion due to volatility of fuel prices and the economic recession. This 
downturn was followed by airline profits starting in 2009. The GAO stated that “although the 
financial performance of individual airlines differed, network airlines as a whole generated 
operating profits of approximately $12 billion from 2007 through 2012, while low-cost airlines 
and regional airlines generated profits of approximately $6.1 billion and $3.6 billion respectively 
over the same period” (GAO, 2014).  
 
Boeing Market Outlook (2014) indicated that passenger traffic continues to rebound from the 
2008-2009 economic downturn. According to Boeing, “overall U.S. passenger traffic has 
averaged 2 percent growth per year since 2009, ahead of capacity growth, which ranged from 1 
to 2 percent per year over the same period. Capacity growth of the low-cost carriers (LCC) 
continues to outpace network carriers, averaging 4 percent in 2013, compared with 1 percent for 
network carriers” (Boeing, 2014).  Abda et al. (2012) stated that the low-cost airline’s share of 
U.S. domestic market is still growing, but is starting to level off. The average number of LLCs 
per U.S. airport initially increased from 0.5 in 1990 to 2.8 in 2005. 
Dealing with prospective LCC entrants is a critical issue for global network carriers. The LCC’s 
choice of which market to enter depends on the barriers to entry, including the reaction of 
network carriers. The strategic decisions of incumbents and new entrants were investigated by a 
number of researchers (Coad and Teruel, 2013; Malighetti et al., 2009; Daraban and Fournier, 
2008; Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008). The decline in air fares is driven by the entry of LCC into 
new markets (Snider and Williams, 2011). LCC entry creates competition and as a result reduces 
both the business and leisure fares of full-service carriers (Alderioghi et al., 2012).  
 
The U.S. government and the airline industry pay close attention to the reaction of carriers to the 
new entrant. The U.S. Department of Transportation restricts predatory practices under the 
Antitrust Law, which protects consumers and businesses from predatory business practices and 
promotes fair competition in an open-market economy.  As such, the established carrier should 
react to new entrants in a way that will remain within legal competitive practices and not be 
classified as predatory, designed to drive new entrants out of the market. Lin et al (2001) stated 
that the major problem is to distinguish between those two areas. 
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This research paper will extend the existing body of literature on the strategic decision making of 
established carriers when they face a potential LCC entrant. These carriers must make the 
strategic decision of whether to deter or to accommodate the LCC entrant move. Good decisions 
require that each decision-maker accurately predict the strategic moves of the other parties 
(McMillan, 1996). While much research has been done investigating the airline behavior in the 
hub-and-spoke system, this paper contributes to the literature by investigating airlines in 
operation with LCC entry at the less congested airports in the U.S., where three to six carriers 
usually operate.  
 
Additionally, this research paper investigates five market characteristics and their effect on the 
airlines’ fares, contributing to the potential success or failure of the LCC entrant. These market 
characteristics include the length of the average flight of a particular airline (stage length), 
number of passengers, number of competitors, number of stops, and oil price. 
 
The report is structured as follows: an overview of literature on airline competitive behavior and 
market characteristics influencing fares; an overview of the selected airlines airports under 
investigation; the methodology behind the research questions and propositions; analysis and 
presentation of findings for two-stage research with the relevant discussion; and the conclusion.  
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Airline Behavior 
 
The aviation industry is very dynamic. LCC and airlines attempting a hybrid strategy are 
common in the short and medium haul aviation markets. Curtis and Rhoades (2013) stated that it 
seems that the establishment of LCCs follows a natural industry progression and a country’s 
economic development. The LCC model seeks to achieve a competitive advantage through the 
reduction of operating costs below the traditional airline model. LCCs tend to pursue growth 
through innovative business models including lower operating costs, which result in the 
reduction of air fares. This stimulates air travel demand by improving the affordability and 
accessibility of air travel in already established markets.  
 
A number of studies investigated the competitive strategies of businesses and what affects 
airlines fares. Airlines’ behavior for pricing plays a large role in competition. Lin et al (2001) 
stated that literature on airline competitive behavior comes from three sources: industrial 
organizational economics, strategy and marketing. Lin et al (2001) researched the determinants 
of price reactions to entry. While some research found evidence for predatory behaviors by 
major airlines, others found little evidence.  
 
Good decisions require that each decision-maker accurately predict the strategic moves of the 
other parties (McMillan, 2000). The network carriers have a choice whether to deter or to 
accommodate the LCC entrant move, and whether to use their strategies independently or in 
collaboration. With a new entrant in the market, airlines can play a game. They can form a 
coalition of players, which can result in the cooperative game, or they can display non-
cooperative behavior. A game depends on the other airlines strategies employed, and can have 
different strategies for different players. Network carriers can cooperate to deter LCC entry by 
threatening or attempting to erect barriers and other obstacles that signal to LCC that entry will 
not be profitable cooperation. Another scenario that one of the network carriers will cooperate 
with LCC if doing so will drive the other network carrier out of market (the collusion between 
network carriers, and the collaboration between one of the network and LCC). Additionally, two 
network carriers can cooperate in signaling LCC entry to the market if the future profits of all 
three airlines can be increased (the cooperation). Axelrod (1992) defined "Tit for Tat" strategy, 
based on simple reciprocity, which cooperates on the first move and then does whatever the other 
player did on the previous move. Axelrod investigated that successful strategy include "the 
avoidance of unnecessary conflict by cooperating as long as the other player does, provocability 
in the face of an uncalled for defection by the other, forgiveness after responding to a 
provocation, and clarity of behavior so the other player can recognize and adapt to your pattern 
of action" (p.2-3). 
 
Airline entry strategy will have an impact on the incumbent airline’s response. Daraban and 
Fournier (2008) conducted research on incumbent responses to low-cost airline entry and exit. 
The research demonstrated that incumbents significantly reduced air fares before and after LCC 
entry. This was especially the case with the entry of Southwest Airlines, when compared with the 
entry of other LCCs. The researchers concluded that pre-entry cut in fares was not to prevent 
LCC entry, but to capture important market shares and get a good reputation before LCC entry.  
The post-entry air fares indicate that most of the competitive effect or the effect of competition 
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was observed about three fiscal quarters after the LCC entry. The adjustment process takes place 
fast, with the new equilibrium fares achieved one or two quarters after the entry. 
Ito and Lee (2003) investigated two primary airline responses to LCC entry: pricing behavior and 
capacity decision. Dresner et al. (2002) findings indicated that the largest price cuts by major 
airlines with the LCC entry occur when the LCC offers their service at a large discount compared 
to the existing on the market prices. Windle and Dresner (1995) indicated that Southwest 
Airlines entrance resulted in 48% decrease in average fare and a 200% increase in passenger 
traffic. It has been a common practice for incumbents to match the new entrant fares. 
Additionally, incumbent carriers often either start using larger aircraft or add additional flight 
frequencies on the LCC entrant routes (Bergantino and Capozzaz, 2013). However, predatory 
behavior is illegal and occurs if an incumbent airline responds to an entrant by lowering its prices 
below its costs and forcing the entrant to accrue financial losses and exit the market (Ito and Lee, 
2003). 
 
Lin et al (2001) investigated 889 incumbent reactions to entry in the U.S. The findings indicated 
that the size of the entrant’s price cut was the most significant indicator for the incumbent’s price 
cut. Other important factors are the size of the entrant and the size of incumbents, the entrant cost 
structure and the number of complaints. If the entrant has a low cost advantage, then the 
incumbent’s price cuts are less likely to work. On the other hand, when a larger carrier enters a 
market, the incumbent responds with a larger price cut. Additionally, the larger incumbents react 
less aggressively than smaller airlines to new entrant’s price cuts. Basically, incumbents are 
more aggressive towards the larger new entrant with higher costs. 
Ito and Lee (2003) find that highly aggressive incumbent reactions are exceptions, and that 
response to LCC entrants on average tends to be fairly accommodating.  They also find no 
evidence that incumbents’ pricing decisions or capacity expansion with LCC entry negatively 
impacts the probability of LCC exit from the market. The entrant success or failure is ultimately 
determined by the LCC capacity, pre-existing market density and LCC pre-entry presence at the 
endpoint of a market. Access to airport facilities, such as gates, is also an important factor. 
On the other hand, Tan (2012) noted that legacy carriers react differently to LCC entry than LCC 
carrier incumbents. LCC entrants tend to undercut legacy carriers while matching the prices of 
LCC incumbents.  Legacy carriers tend to decrease their average airfare before and after entry by 
LCC. However, LCCs do not significantly change their prices in response to entry by another 
LCC.  Ito and Lee (2003) stated the incumbents’ fare responses might be smaller due to the 
limitation of using average fares. Legacy carriers tend to have more differentiated fare structures 
than LCCs by offering different classes of service. Moreover, incumbents match the price cuts of 
LCCs on a limited inventory basis. Research has found that different strategies are implemented 
by different LCCs. Frontier appears to utilize a “cream skimming” strategy, entering on a small 
scale and only moderately cutting price, while AirTran appears to be more aggressive in terms of 
capacity and fare reduction (Ito and Lee, 2003). The nature of competition will depend on LCC 
entry strategy. 
 
Kwoka et al. (2012) found that the fare competition in the airline industry in the U.S. is driven by 
the LCC segment. Legacy carriers play a large role in the fare determination and are influenced 
by the LCCs and other carriers. The collective share of LCCs in the market and its structure are 
important, whether one or more LCCs are present in the market. A more concentrated LCC 
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segment is linked to a smaller fare reduction. Competition among LCCs is different from major 
carriers (Kwoka et al., 2012). Kwoka et al. (2012) found that major airline fares are not affected 
much by other majors, while LCCs drive down major airline fares substantially, especially 
Southwest Airlines. LCC prices are not constrained by major airlines, while LCCs compete 
against each other in the price determination. 
Overall, Gorin and Belobaba (2005) concluded that it is very difficult to evaluate predatory 
behavior in airline markets using traditional approaches based on revenues and costs. Revenue 
management and flows of network passengers is very complex and might affect research based 
on average fares, revenues or traffic. Gorin and Belobaba (2005) stated that their research results 
have shown that these traditional measures provide little information regarding the behavior of 
incumbents and their response to LCCs entry. Airline strategies before and after the LCC entrant 
are affected by a large number of factors including revenue management, entrant capacity 
relative to incumbent carrier capacity, pricing strategy, and flows of network passengers. 
 
Market Characteristics  
 
In order to assess competition in an industry, the following market characteristics have to be 
considered: 
 “the average number of effective competitors in different segments of the market; 
 the types of airlines, including the presence of network and low-cost airlines, in the 
market; 
 airline market share of passengers at the route and airport level;  
 barriers to entry, including practices or conditions that may impede a firm’s ability to 
enter a market” (GOA, 2014).  
 
Airline markets differ by the level of competitiveness, entry barriers, the presence of slot –
controlled airports, the type of customers on the route, the other airports in the area, and other 
factors (Lin et al, 2001).  Competition from potential competitors, connect service and adjacent-
airports service is also important in understanding airline competition (Kwoka et al., 2012). 
A high level of competition is linked to the slot controls at airports where the fares will be 
generally higher. The high level of competition, which links to the number of competitors and 
their routes, will push fares down and therefore may limit the fare response with the new entrant. 
If an alternate airport is nearby to the airport under investigation, then the carriers in operation 
might not cut their prices, preferring to switch to the nearby airport (Lin et al, 2001). Airport 
congestion can also be a factor. Lin at al. (2001) proposed that at congested, gate-restricted 
airports, the price cut by incumbents might be smaller because the congestion might limit new 
entrants ability to gain market share. 
Borenstein (1989) proposed a model using market share at the route and airport level. Market 
share influences an airlines’ ability to raise fares since airline dominance at the airport increases 
its market share on the routes.  LCC carriers usually fly point to point and not through a hub, and 
as such the total distance flown is less than that which a network carrier would fly. Therefore, the 
addition of a shorter, non-stop point to point route should result in a lower fare. However, the 
hub option, used by the incumbent carriers, generally offers more options to travelers and can be 
seen as more flexible. For passengers who choose to fly this route, they may experience what is 
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known as a hub premium and this could result in the increased air fares. “Based on a comparison 
of fares at 10 dominated hub airports, DOT estimated that 24.7 million passengers in hub 
markets with no low-fare competitor paid on average 41 percent more than those flying in hub 
markets with low-fare competitors. Passengers in short-haul hub markets (750 miles or less) 
without a low-fare carrier on average pay even more.” (GAO, 2001).  
Brueckner et al. (2013) find that most forms of legacy-carrier competition have weak effects on 
average fares, while LCC competition had a significant fare impact either on the airport-pair or at 
adjacent airports (Brueckner, 2013). Morrison (2001) stated that airlines can influence air fares 
on a route in three ways: serving the route, serving an adjacent route that can be perceived as 
substitution, or lower air fares in general to deter the entrant and potential competitor.  
 
Increasing oil prices will continue to affect all airlines, especially as the percentage of total 
operating costs increases as a result of fuel price (CAPA, 2009). “Fuel costs rose for both 
network and low-cost airlines during the recent recession, and now comprise a greater percentage 
of airlines’ operating costs. From 2007 through 2012, for example, fuel costs grew from 31 to 38 
percent of operating costs for low-cost airlines, and from 26 to 29 percent of network airline 
operating costs” (GOA, 2014). As an example, for Southwest Airlines, the largest low-cost 
airline, fuel costs grew from 30% of operating costs in 2007 to 37% percent in 2012. As a result, 
it became harder for LCC’s to keep prices low if they wanted to keep up. “Low-cost airlines have 
not achieved the same cost reductions since 2007 that network airlines have accomplished, and 
instead have experienced rising unit costs” (GOA, 2014). The impact of higher fuel prices has 
been greater for LCCs because those airlines reduced aircraft utilization, or the average number 
of hours that an aircraft is in flight in a 24-hour period. 
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AIRLINES AND AIRPORTS 
 
Low Cost Carriers in the United States were identified using the LCC CAPA database (see Table 
1). 
 
Table 1 LCC in the United States 
 IATA Code Airline Principal Hub  
1 FL AirTran Airways, TX Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport  
2 G4 Allegiant Air, NV Las Vegas McCarran International Airport  
3 F9 Frontier Airlines, CO Denver International Airport  
4 B6 JetBlue Airways, NY New York John F Kennedy International Airport  
5 WN Southwest Airlines, TX Chicago Midway International Airport  
6 NK Spirit Airlines, FL Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport  
7 VX Virgin America, CA San Francisco International Airport  
Source: CAPA database 
 
Using CAPA Centre for Aviation, secondary U.S. airports with 2-5 airlines in operation 
(including LCCs) were identified. Only few airports were selected due to availability of 
published fares (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2 Secondary Airports Summary 
 LCC Entry LCC Entry LCC Majors   
1. McGhee Tyson Airport, TN AirTran Q2 2009  Frontier Q3 2007 2 4   
2. Newport News/Williamsburg Intern Airport, VA Frontier Q3 2010   1 3   
3. Palm Spring International Airport, CA Frontier Q3 2010 Virgin America Q4 2011 2 4   
4. Portland International Airport, OR JetBlue Q2 2006 Southwest  2 3   
5. Richmond International Airport, VA AirTran  Q2 2005 JetBlue Q1 2006 2 4   
6. Sarasote Bradenton International Airport, FL JetBlue Q4 2006   1 4   
7. Westchester County Airport, NY AirTran Q2 2006 JetBlue Q1 2007  2 4   
8. Atlantic City International Airport, NJ AirTran Q2 2009  Spirit  2 1   
9. Capital Region International Airport, MI Frontier Q4 2013 Sun Country Q4 2010 2 2   
10. McAllen Miller International Airport, TX Allegiant  Q3 2005    1 2   
 
Three airports (Atlantic City International, Capital Region International and McAllen Miller 
International) did not have fares available in the MasFlight database, and were therefore removed 
from the research. 
 
McGhee Tyson Airport, TN  
 
The airport was opened in 1927 with the first commercial flight operated in 1937. The airport is 
owned and operated by the Metropolitan Knoxville Airport Authority, which was established in 
1978. The airport is located 12 miles south of Knoxville, Tennessee in Alcoa. Knoxville has a 
population of 184,281 according to the U.S. Census Bureau (2015). However, Alcoa is part of 
the Knoxville, Tennessee metropolitan area, which this airport also serves and had an estimated 
population of 852,715 people in 2013. 
 
The non-stop domestic destinations from McGhee Tyson Airport (TYS) are Atlanta, Charlotte, 
Chicago, Dallas/Ft. Worth, Detroit, Sanford, Houston, Washington DC (both airports), Denver, 
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and Minneapolis St. Paul. The nearest airports within 200 miles of TYS are Nashville 
International Airport (176 miles), Tri-Cities Regional Airport (100 miles), Chattanooga 
Metropolitan Airport (103 miles) and Asheville Regional Airport, NC (123 miles).  
 
Airport operational data is presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 McGhee Tyson Airport (TYS) 
Summary Data (U.S. Flights Only) Carrier Shares, Oct 2012-Sep 2013**** 
Passengers* 2012** 2013** %Chg Rank*** Carrier PAX Share 
Arrival 846k 813k -3.87% 91 ExpressJet 501 31% 
Departure 849k 818k -3.65% 91 PSA 333 20% 
Scheduled Flights Pinnacle 205 13% 
Departures 19,896 18,801 -5.50% 84 Allegiant 204 13% 
Freight/Mail (lb.) (Scheduled and Non-Scheduled) American Eagle 178 11% 
Total 106m 95m -10.45% 69 Other 210 13% 
Carriers  
Scheduled 20 17 -15%   
* Scheduled enplaned revenue passengers. 
** 12 months ending September of each year.  
*** Among 804 U.S. airports, 12 months ending September 2013 
****Based on enplaned passengers (000) both arriving and departing. 
Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2015 
 
Newport News/Williamsburg International Airport, VA  
 
Commercial service here began in 1949 with Piedmont Airlines. At that time, the airport was 
called Patrick Henry Airport. It was renamed first in the mid 1970s and then in 1990 as Newport 
News/Williamsburg International Airport. It is operated by the Peninsula Airport Commission, 
which was created in 1946. The airport is located 9 miles northwest of downtown Newport 
News, Virginia and serves the Hampton Roads metropolitan area in Virginia, which includes 
Chesapeake, Franklin, Hampton, Newport News, Norfolk, Poquoson, Portsmouth, Suffolk, 
Virginia Beach and Williamsburg, and the counties of Gloucester, Isle of Wight, James City, 
Southampton, Surry and York. A part of this also covers a small part of North Carolina’s 
Hampton Roads metropolitan has an estimated population of 1,707,369 people according to the 
U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
The deregulation significantly affected the airport, causing all of its jet passenger services to be 
removed. Airlines eventually came back with traffic of over 1 million passengers at its highest 
point. However, its biggest carrier, AirTran, ceased operations in 2012 and resulted in a decline 
in passenger count flying in and out of the airport.  
 
The nearest airports within 200 miles are Richmond International Airport (60 miles), Ronald 
Reagan Washington National Airport (169 miles), Washington Dulles International Airport 173 
miles), Norfolk International Airport (28 miles), Charlottesville Albemarle Airport (146 miles),  
Pitt-Greenville Airport (153 miles), Salisbury-Ocean City Wicomico Regional Airport (154 
miles) and Coastal Carolina Regional Airport (177 miles).  
 
Airport operational data is presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4 Newport News/Williamsburg International Airport (PHF) 
Summary Data (U.S. Flights Only) Carrier Shares, Oct 2012 - Sep 2013**** 
Passengers* 2012** 2013** %Chg Rank*** Carrier PAX Share 
Arrival 376k 274k -27.12% 155 ExpressJet 146 27% 
Departure 365k 273k -25.20% 155 Wisconsin 143 26% 
Scheduled Flights Piedmont 75.93 14% 
Departures 7,662 6,516 -14.96% 160 Frontier 62.45 11% 
Freight/Mail (lb.) (Scheduled and Non-Scheduled) PSA 46.71 9% 
Total 32k 33k 2.38% 542 Other 71.84 13% 
Carriers  
Scheduled       9    7 -22.22%   
* Scheduled enplaned revenue passengers. 
** 12 months ending September of each year.  
*** Among 804 U.S. airports, 12 months ending September 2013 
****Based on enplaned passengers (000) both arriving and departing. 
Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2015 
 
Palm Springs International Airport, CA  
 
Passenger flights began here in 1945 with Western airlines. The airport was purchased in 1961 
by the City of Palm Springs from the military and named  Palm Springs Municipal Airport. The 
airport is located 2 miles east of downtown Palm Springs, California and has population of 
46,854 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). It also located in the Inlands Empire area of southern 
California, a Riverside county which has a population of 2,329,271 people. 
 
The airport is a favorite tourist destination and therefore a lot of the operations are seasonal. The 
top destinations are: San Francisco, Phoenix, Seattle, Dallas/Fort Worth, Denver, Los Angeles, 
Chicago, Portland, Salt Lake City and Minneapolis, Vancouver, Winnipeg, Calgary and Toronto.  
The nearest airports within 200 miles to PSP are LA/Ontario International Airport (72 miles), 
John Wayne Airport (100 miles), San Diego International Airport (145 miles), Imperial County 
Airport (102 miles), Long Beach Airport (114 miles), McClellan-Palomar Airport (117 miles). 
 
Airport operational data is presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 Palm Springs International Airport (PSP) 
Summary Data (U.S. Flights Only) Carrier Shares, Oct 2012 - Sep 2013**** 
Passengers* 2012** 2013** %Chg Rank*** Carrier PAX Share 
Arrival 733k 757k 3.29% 96 SkyWest 612 40% 
Departure 736k 761k 3.42% 95 Alaska 347 23% 
Scheduled Flights American 269 18% 
Departures 12,435 12,347 -0.71% 108 Allegiant 75.69 5% 
Freight/Mail (lb.) (Scheduled and Non-Scheduled) Horizon Air 48.56 3% 
Total 253k 294k 16.38% 391 Other 166 11% 
Carriers  
Scheduled 13 12 -7.69%   
* Scheduled enplaned revenue passengers. 
** 12 months ending September of each year.  
*** Among 804 U.S. airports, 12 months ending September 2013 
****Based on enplaned passengers (000) both arriving and departing. 
Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2015 
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Portland International Airport, OR  
 
The current site of the airport was purchased in 1936 by the Portland City Council. The city of 
Portland has had two other airports: Swan Island Municipal Airport and Portland-Columbia 
Airport. Passenger service began as early as 1957. It is located about 12 miles northeast of 
downtown Portland. The city of Portland has a population of 619,360 people (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2015). However, it also serves the Portland Metropolitan Area, which consists of the 
cities of Vancouver, Gresham, Hillsboro and Beaverton with a total population of 2,314,554. 
 
Portland International Airport serves both civil and military traffic and is the largest commercial 
airport in the state of Oregon. The top ten domestic destinations are San Francisco, CA, 
Seattle/Tacoma, WA, Denver, CO,  Phoenix, AZ, Los Angeles, CA, Las Vegas, NV, Chicago 
(O'Hare), IL, Salt Lake City, UT, San Jose, CA and Atlanta, GA. Some international destinations 
are Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Puerto Vallarta and Tokyo. 
 
The nearest airports within 200 miles are: Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (162), Kenmore 
Air Harbor Seaplane Base (175 miles), Eugene Airport (130 miles), Roberts Field (144 miles) 
and King County International Airport (167 miles).  
 
Airport operational data is presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 Portland International Airport (PDX) 
Summary Data (U.S. Flights Only) Carrier Shares, Oct 2012 – Sep 2013**** 
Passengers* 2012** 2013** %Chg Rank*** Carrier PAX Share 
Arrival 6,814k 7,110k 4.34%    29 Southwest 2,674 19% 
Departure 6,807k 7,105k 4.38%    29 Alaska 2,645 19% 
Scheduled Flights Horizon Air 2,602 18% 
Departures 83,118 83,316 0.24%     29 United 1,673 12% 
Freight/Mail (lb.) (Scheduled and Non-Scheduled) Delta 1,398 10% 
Total 418m 422m 0.82%     21 Other 3,222 23% 
Carriers  
Scheduled 21          20 -4.76%   
* Scheduled enplaned revenue passengers. 
** 12 months ending September of each year.  
*** Among 804 U.S. airports, 12 months ending September 2013 
****Based on enplaned passengers (000) both arriving and departing. 
Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2015 
 
Richmond International Airport, VA  
 
The airport was dedicated in 1927 and named after Admiral Richard Byrd. It is owned and 
operated by the Capital Region Airport Authority created in 1975 and is the busiest airport in 
central Virginia. It serves as a combined public civil-military airport. The first regularly 
scheduled passenger services began in 1932 with Eastern Airlines. The airport is located in 
Sandston, Virginia but the largest city near it is Richmond, Virginia with a population of 214,853 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). 
 
Some of the top destinations from Richmond International Airport include Atlanta, Charlotte, 
Chicago, Boston, Dallas/Fort Worth, Philadelphia, Orlando, New York, Detroit, Newark, Tampa 
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and Washington D.C. The nearest airports with 200 miles are: Ronald Reagan Washington 
National Airport (115 miles), Washington Dulles International Airport (119 miles), 
Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport (149 miles), Raleigh-Durham 
International Airport (161 miles),  Newport News/Williamsburg International Airport (60 miles), 
Charlottesville Albemarle Airport (87 miles) and Norfolk International Airport (87 miles). 
 
Airport operational data is presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 Richmond International Airport (RIC) 
Summary Data (U.S. Flights Only) Carrier Shares, Oct 2012 - Sep 2013**** 
Passengers* 2012** 2013** %Chg Rank*** Carrier Passengers Share 
Arrival 1,553k 1,561k 0.48% 69 Delta 674 21% 
Departure 1,569k 1,575k 0.42% 69 ExpressJet 417 13% 
Scheduled Flights AirTran 302 10% 
Departures 28,810 27,672 -3.95% 63 JetBlue 251 8% 
Freight/Mail (lb.) (Scheduled and Non-Scheduled) US Airways 236 8% 
Total 111m 123m 11.45% 60 Other 1,258 40% 
Carriers  
Scheduled 28 22 -21.4%   
* Scheduled enplaned revenue passengers. 
** 12 months ending September of each year.  
*** Among 804 U.S. airports, 12 months ending September 2013 
****Based on enplaned passengers (000) both arriving and departing. 
Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2015 
 
Sarasota Bradenton International Airport, FL  
 
The airport dates back to 1939 when local government from Sarasota and Manatee counties 
decided to construct an airport to service both counties. It is operated by Sarasota Manatee Joint 
Airport Authority. Commercial passenger service began as early as 1940, however jet service 
was only introduced in 1965 by National Airlines. The word “international” was added to the 
airport in 1992. The largest cities near the airport are Sarasota (3 miles north) and Bradenton (6 
miles south). The city of Sarasota has a population of 54,214, the city of Bradenton has a 
population of 52,769 and the county has 390,962 people (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015).  
 
The top destinations include New York, Boston, Atlanta, Chicago, Washington D.C, Charlotte, 
Toronto, Montreal, Frankfurt, London and Paris. The nearest airports within 200 miles are: 
Tampa International Airport (51 miles), Southwest Florida International Airport (93 miles), 
Orlando International Airport (125 miles), Orlando Sanford International Airport (156 miles), St. 
Petersburg-Clearwater International Airport (43 miles), Charlotte County Airport (63 miles), and 
Naples Municipal Airport (121 miles). 
 
Airport operational data is presented in Table 8. 
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Table 8 Sarasota Bradenton International Airport (SRQ) 
Summary Data (U.S. Flights Only) Carrier Shares, Oct 2012 - Sept 2013**** 
Passengers* 2012** 2013** %Chg Rank*** Carrier: Passengers Share 
Arrival 637k 563k -11.64% 110 Delta 619 55% 
Departure 646k 570k -11.79% 110 JetBlue 259 23% 
Scheduled Flights PSA 75.13 7% 
Departures 6,308 5,490 -12.97% 177 United 71.52 6% 
Freight/Mail (lb.) (Scheduled and Non-Scheduled) Mesa 39.84 4% 
Total 438k 402k -8.07% 367 Other 67.78 6% 
Carriers  
Scheduled 8 12 50.00%   
* Scheduled enplaned revenue passengers. 
** 12 months ending September of each year.  
*** Among 804 U.S. airports, 12 months ending September 2013 
****Based on enplaned passengers (000) both arriving and departing. 
Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2015 
 
Westchester County Airport, NY 
 
The airport was re-opened for civil operation in 1945, but the first flight took off in 1948 with 
American Airlines. It continued as a joint military-civil airport until 1983 when the suburban 
area of Westchester began expanding. The airport is located 5 miles east of White Plains, NY 
and 30 miles north of New York. It serves suburban Westchester County, which has a population 
of 972,634 people (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). It also serves the Fairfield County area in 
Connecticut, which includes large cities such as Bridgeport, Stamford, Norwalk and Danbury 
and has a combined population of 939,904 people. Finally, it also services the New York 
Metropolitan area, which has a population of 23,484,225 people.  
 
The following destinations are served by the airlines from Westchester County Airport: Chicago, 
IL, Hyannis, MA, Lebanon, NH, Martha’s Vineyard, MA, Nantucket, MA, Provincetown, MA, 
Atlanta, GA, Detroit, MI, Orlando, FL, Tampa, FL, West Palm Beach, FL, Charlotte, SC, 
Philadelphia, PA, and Washington, DC. The nearest airports within 200 miles are: LaGuardia 
Airport (31 miles), John F. Kennedy International Airport (38 miles), Newark Liberty 
International Airport (48 miles), Bradley International Airport (97 miles), Teterboro Airport (36 
miles), Tweed New Haven Regional Airport (55 miles), Stewart International Airport (62 miles), 
Morristown Municipal Airport (65 miles) and Long Island MacArthur Airport (67 miles). 
 
Airport operational data is presented in Table 9. 
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Table 9 Westchester County Airport (HPN) 
Summary Data (U.S. Flights Only) Carrier Shares, Oct 2012 – Sept 2013**** 
Passengers* 2012** 2013** %Chg Rank*** Carrier Passengers Share 
Arrival 913k 744k -18.54% 98 JetBlue 724 48% 
Departure 917k 752k -18.05% 97 ExpressJet 235 16% 
Scheduled Flights Wisconsin 100 7% 
Departures 18,368 15,501 -15.61% 94 Chautauqua 95.72 6% 
Freight/Mail (lb.) (Scheduled and Non-Scheduled) Pinnacle 87.57 6% 
Total 34k 37k 8.07% 531 Other 253 17% 
Carriers  
Scheduled 16 12 -25.00%   
* Scheduled enplaned revenue passengers. 
** 12 months ending September of each year.  
*** Among 804 U.S. airports, 12 months ending September 2013 
****Based on enplaned passengers (000) both arriving and departing. 
Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2015 
 
Overall airports summary is presented in Appendix A Table 20. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
This research was conducted in two stages.  
Stage 1: The effect of a low carrier entry on airlines at the selected small-sized U.S. domestic 
airports.  
Quarterly air fares were collected for the airlines operating in the market one year prior 
LCC entry and two years after. 
 
Stage 2: The influence of select indicators on airfares with LCC entry. 
Dependent variable: The average fares of airlines flying in the same market as 
LCC entrant. 
Predictor variables: Stage length, number of passengers in economy class, number 
of competitors in the same market, number of stops, and oil price. 
 
Major airlines origin-destinations were matched with the origin-destinations of LLCs for the 
same airport. For each identified airport, the following route-specific data was obtained using 
MasFlight database: 
1. The average quarterly one-way fare in economy class one year prior to LCC entry 
and two years afterwards including data for LCC  
2. Stage length including middle point (the length of the average flight of a 
particular airline)  
3. Number of stops 
4. Number of competitors 
5. The price of crude oil, WTI Cushing Oklahoma (U.S. Department of Energy) 
6. The average quarterly number of passengers in economy class one year prior to 
LCC entry and two years afterwards  
 
Research questions: 
a. Which of the five variables are included in an equation for predicting fares of airlines 
flying in the same market as LCC entrant?  
b. Does the obtained regression equation resulting from a subset of the five predictor 
variables allow a reliable prediction of the fare behavior of airlines operating in the same 
market following LCC entrance? 
 
Based on the literature review, the following five propositions are presented. Airline fares will 
increase with: 
1. An increase in the stage length (the longer the route, the higher the costs and the higher 
the fare).  
2. A decrease in the number of passengers in economy class (less passengers result in higher 
fare).  
3. A decrease in the number of competitors in the market (less competitors, higher fare).  
4. A decrease in the number of stops (the fewer the stops, the higher the fare).  
5. An increase in oil price (the higher the oil price, the higher the fare). 
 
Stepwise multiple regression or statistical multiple regression is used in the research that is 
exploratory in nature (Mertler and Vannatta, 2005, p.170). The research has a set of predictor 
variables to determine which specific independent variables make meaningful contributions to 
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the overall prediction of the model. There are three variations of stepwise regression: forward 
selection, stepwise selection and backward deletion. Field (2009, p.213) suggested using the 
backward method because of suppressor effects, which occur when a predictor has a significant 
effect when another variable is held constant. In contrast, forward method runs a higher risk of 
making a Type II error, which is missing a predictor that can predict the outcome.  
 
Backward deletion method first computes an equation with all predictors, followed by a 
significance test or a partial F-test for every predictor to determine the level of contribution to the 
overall prediction. Then the partial F of the predictor is compared to the pre-selected value. 
Based on the analyses of F-values, the predictor can be removed from the analysis. The process 
continues until significant predictors remain in the equation. 
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ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
 
Stage 1 Research 
 
Stage 1 of the research investigated the effect of a low carrier entry on airlines at the selected 
seven U.S. domestic airports.  
 
McGhee Tyson Airport, TN 
 
Frontier Airlines entry Q3 2007  
The results of the analyses indicated that three airlines (Delta, US Airways and American 
Airlines) increased their fares with Frontier Airlines entry in the first year, while Untied had a 
slight decrease. In the second year of Frontier operation, most airlines decreased their fares with 
the exception of United Airlines (see Figure 4 and Table 13).  
 
Figure 1 Fare change with Frontier Airlines  
 
 
 
Table 10 Percent change in fares with Frontier Airlines entry 
% Change in fares Yr. before entry - Yr. of entry  Yr. of entry - 1 yr. after 
Delta Air Lines 12% -9.32% 
United Airlines -3% 9.74% 
US Airways 16% -4.70% 
American Airlines 7% -0.88% 
Frontier Airlines (entrant)   -2.92% 
 
AirTran Airways entry Q2 2009 
The results of the analyses indicated that the fares of airlines under the investigation (Delta, 
United and US Airways), had a significant decrease in the first year with AirTran Airways entry, 
followed by the fare increase in the second year (see Figure 2 and Table 11).  
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Q306-Q207 Q307-Q208 Q308-Q209
Delta United American US Airways Frontier
19 
 
Figure 2 Change in fares with AirTran Airways entry 
 
 
Table 11 Percent change in fares with AirTran Airways entry 
% Change in fares Yr. before entry - Yr. of entry  Yr. of entry - 1 yr. after 
Delta Air Lines -10% -19% 
United Airlines -20% 1% 
US Airways -43% 10% 
AirTran Airways (entrant)  46% 
 
Newport News/Williamsburg Intern Airport, VA 
Frontier Airlines entry Q3 2010 
The results of the analyses indicated that out of three airlines under the investigation (Delta, 
United and US Airways), two airlines (Delta and United) had fares decrease in the first year with 
Frontier Airlines entry, while US Airways had a slight fare increase. In the second year of 
operation, all airlines including Frontier had their fares increased (see Figure 3 and Table 12).  
 
Figure 3 Fare Change with Frontier Airlines entry 
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Table 12 Percent change in fares with Frontier Airlines entry 
% Change in fares Yr. before entry - Yr. of entry  Yr. of entry - 1 yr. after 
Delta Air Lines -3.60% 22.29% 
United Airlines -6.32% 15.44% 
US Airways 3.62% 5.11% 
Frontier Airlines (entrant)   18.99% 
 
Palm Spring International Airport, CA 
Frontier Airlines entry Q3 2010  
The results of the analyses indicated that two airlines (Delta and US Airways), which served the 
same market as Frontier Airlines, increased their fares with Frontier Airlines entry in the first 
year. Delta Air Lines had a decrease, while US Airways had an increase in the second year (see 
Figure 4 and Table 13).  
 
Figure 4 Fare Change with Frontier Airlines entry 
 
Table 13 Percent change in fares with Frontier Airlines entry 
% Change in fares Yr. before entry - Yr. of entry  Yr. of entry - 1 yr. after 
Delta Airlines 16.37% -8.83% 
American Airlines*  4.35% 
US Airways 7.39% 12.98% 
Frontier Airlines (entrant)   12.14% 
*AA did not fly to same destinations as Frontier in the 1st year if operations. Hence the % change in fare is the 
difference between the year 3 and the year 1. 
 
Virgin America entry Q4 2011 
The results of the analyses indicated that out of three airlines under the investigation (Delta, US 
Airways and Alaskan Airlines), only Alaskan Airlines decreased its fares with the Virgin 
America entry in the first year, followed by an increase in the second year. Delta Air Lines had 
increases each year, while US Airways had an increase in the first year followed by a decrease in 
fares in the second year (see Figure 5 and Table 14). American Airlines did not have common 
routes with Virgin America, therefore was not included in the analyses. It is interesting to note 
that Virgin America had a slight decrease in fares in its second year of operation. 
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Figure 5 Fare Change with Virgin America entry 
 
Table 14 Percent change in fares with Virgin America entry 
% Change in fares Yr. before entry  - Yr. of entry  Yr. of entry - 1 yr. after 
Delta Air Lines 1.86% 27.98% 
US Airways 18.85% -17.58% 
Alaskan Airlines -16.20% 14.37% 
Virgin America (entrant) 0.00% -2.46% 
 
Portland International Airport, OR 
 
JetBlue Airways entry Q2 2006 
The results of the analyses indicated that three airlines under the investigation (Delta, United and 
US Airways) reduced their fares in the first year and increased in the second year after JetBlue 
Airways entered the market (see Figure 6 and Table 15). 
 
Figure 6 Fare Change with JetBlue Airways entry 
 
Table 15 Percent change in fares with JetBlue entry 
% Change in fares Yr. before entry - Yr. of entry  Yr. of entry - 1 yr. after 
Delta Air Lines -20.23% 8.59% 
United Airlines -9.72% 12.41% 
US Airways -0.80% 12.80% 
JetBlue Airways (entrant)   2.18% 
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Richmond International Airport, VA 
 
AirTran Airways entry Q2 2005 
The results of the analyses indicated that out of four airlines under investigation (Delta, United, 
US Airways and American), Delta Airlines decreased its fares with AirTran Airways entry in the 
first year. American Airlines and United Airlines had insignificant fare changes, while US 
Airways increased their fares. In the second year, all four airlines had fare increases while the 
entrant AirTran Airways decreased their fares (see Figure 7 and Table 16). 
 
Figure 7 Fare Change with AirTran Airways entry 
 
 
Table 16 Percent change in fares with AirTran Airways entry 
% Change in fares Yr. before entry - Yr. of entry Yr. of entry - 1 yr. after 
Delta Air Lines -12.41% 4.76% 
United Airlines 0.86% 4.88% 
US Airways  6.4% 9.41% 
American Airlines -0.37% 9.87% 
AirTran Airways (entrant)  -7.36% 
 
JetBlue Airways entry Q1 2006 
The results of the analyses indicated that out of five airlines under investigation (Delta, United, 
US Airways, American, and AirTran Airways) four airlines increased their fares, while Air Tran 
Airways, which is LLC, had reduction in fares. In the second year of JetBlue entry most airlines 
had decreased their fares including JetBlue Airways with the exception of AirTran Airways 
which had a fare increase (see Figure 8 and Table 17). 
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Figure 8 Fare Change with JetBlue Airways entry 
 
AirTran Airways data from Q2 2005 
 
 
Table 17 Percent change in fares with JetBlue Airways entry 
% Change in fares Yr. before entry - Yr. of entry Yr. of entry - 1 yr. after 
Delta Air Lines 11.74% -3.82% 
United Airlines 12.65% -0.02% 
US Airways  0.06% -1.57% 
American Airlines 17.84% -3.86% 
AirTran Airways -26.12% 35.69% 
JetBlue Airways   -1.52% 
 
Sarasota Bradenton International Airport, FL 
 
JetBlue Airways entry Q4 2006 
The results of the analyses indicated that out of four airlines under investigation (American, 
Delta, United, and US Airways) two airlines increased their fares (American and US Airways), 
while another two airlines (Delta and United) had fare decreases. In the second year of JetBlue 
entry, three airlines including the entrant decreased fares, while two airlines (United and US 
Airways) had fares increase (see Figure 9 and Table 18). 
 
Figure 9 Fare Change with JetBlue Airways entry  
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Table 18 Percent change in fares with JetBlue entry 
% Change in fares Yr. before entry - Yr. of entry  Yr. of entry - 1 yr. after 
American Airlines 25.45% -14.49% 
Delta Air Lines -6.56% -23.33% 
United Airlines -19.95% 16.97% 
US Airways 6.1% 4.78% 
JetBlue Airways (entrant)   -6.06% 
 
Westchester County Airport, NY 
 
AirTran Airways entry Q2 2006  
The results of the analyses indicated that while Delta Air Lines and US Airways had a slight 
increase in fares with the AirTran Airways entry, United Airlines had a slight decrease in the 
first year. In the second year, airlines including AirTran Airways had decreases with the 
exception of Delta Air Lines, which had a slight increase in fares (see Figure 10 and Table 19). 
American Airlines did not serve the same market at AirTran Airways and was not included. 
   
Figure 10 Fare Change with AirTran Airways entry
 
Table 19 Percent change in fares with AirTran entry 
% Change in fares Yr. before entry   - Yr. of entry  Yr. of entry - 1 yr. after 
Delta Air Lines 0.7% 2.1% 
United Airlines -1.9% -32.7% 
US Airways 2.5% -10.7% 
AirTran Airways (entrant)   -0.7% 
 
JetBlue Airways entry Q1 2007 
The results of the analyses indicated that out of four airlines under investigation (Delta, United, 
US Airways and AirTran Airways) three had fare decreases in the first year with the exception of 
Delta Air Lines.  Delta had a fare increase with JetBlue Airways entry. In the second year, Delta, 
United and JetBlue decreased their fares, while US Airways and AirTran Airways increased their 
fares (see Figure 11 and Table 20). 
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Figure 11 Fare Change with JetBlue Airways entry 
 
Table 20 Percent change in fares with JetBlue entry 
% Change in fares Yr. before entry - Yr. of entry  Yr. of entry - 1 yr. after 
Delta Air Lines 5.56% -7.07% 
United Airways -29.79% -14.14% 
US Airways -11.75% 6.22% 
AirTran Airways -7.27% 15.45% 
JetBlue Airways (entrant)   -16.94% 
 
 
Discussion of the Stage 1 Results  
 
The purpose of this stage of research was to investigate airline behavior or competitive reaction 
by established airlines when they face an LCC entrant in the less congested, small-sized U.S. 
regional airports with only few airlines in operation. The results of analyses indicated that there 
were no specific patterns discovered in airline behavior in a market with LCC entry. While some 
airlines decreased their fares in the first year following the entrant, other airlines demonstrated 
fare increases. No pattern was discovered in the second year of operation as well. In addition, the 
LCC itself demonstrated either fares increases or decrease in the second year of operation. 
Airlines have competition on routes. One of the limitations of this research is that the average 
market fares will not correctly reflect airline behavior because airlines are competing on the 
individual routes. Seasonality, day of the week and time of the flight are also play a large role in 
airline revenue management. 
 
Stage 2 Research 
 
The second stage of the research investigated five indicators, such as the stage length, number of 
passengers in economy class, number of competitors, number of stops and price of oil, and its 
effect on the fares of airlines in the market with LCC entry. 
 
McGhee Tyson Airport, TN 
 
Frontier Airlines entry Q3 2007 
Airlines in operation in the same market: Delta Air Lines, US Airways, American Airlines, 
United Airlines, and Air Tran Airways (from Q2 2009). 
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Backward multiple regression was conducted to determine which independent variables were the 
predictors of the fare behavior for the airlines in operation with the Frontier Airlines market 
entry in Q3 2007 (see Appendix B Table 21). 
 
Regression analysis indicates an overall model of three predictors out of five variables (stage 
length, number of passengers in economy class, and number of competitors in the market) that 
significantly predict fare behavior of airlines operating in the same market, R²=0.103, R²adj.= 
.097, F(3,407)= 15.624, p<.001. The model accounts for 10% of variance in fares of airlines with 
the LCC Frontier Airlines entry.  
 
Beta coefficients indicate that the airlines’ fares will increase with an increase in the stage length, 
and decreases in the number of competitors in the market and number of passenger in economy 
class. 
 
AirTran Airways entry Q2 2009 
Airlines in operation in the same market: Delta Air Lines, US Airways, and United Airlines. 
Frontier Airlines was excluded from the analysis since its market is different from AirTran 
Airways. 
 
Backward multiple regression was conducted to determine which independent variables were the 
predictors of the fare behavior for the airlines with the AirTran Airways market entry (see 
Appendix B Table 22). Regression analysis indicates an overall model of three variables (number 
of passengers in economy class, number of competitors, and WTI) that significantly predict fare 
behavior of airlines operation in the same market, R²=0.711, R²adj.= .669, F(3,21)= 17.201, 
p<.001.  
 
The model accounts for 71% of variance in fares of airlines with the LCC AirTran Airways 
market entry. Beta coefficients indicate that major airlines’ fares will increase with decreases in 
the number of passengers, number of competitors in the market, and the oil price. 
 
Newport News/Williamsburg International Airport, VA 
Frontier Airlines entry Q3 2010 
Airlines in operation in the same market: Delta Air Lines, US Airways, and United Airlines.  
 
Backward multiple regression was conducted to determine which independent variables were the 
predictors of the fare behavior for the airlines with the Frontier Airlines market entry (see 
Appendix C Table 23). Regression analysis indicates an overall model of two variables (WTI 
and the stage length) that significantly predict fare behavior of airlines operation in the same 
market, R²=0.110, R²adj.= 0.104, F(2,304)= 18.743, p<.001.  
 
The model accounts for 11% of variance in fares of airlines with the LCC Frontier Airlines 
market entry. Beta coefficients indicate that major airlines’ fares will increase with increases in 
WTI and the stage length. 
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Palm Spring International Airport, CA 
 
Virgin America entry Q4 2011      
Airlines in operation in the same market:  American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, US Airways, and 
Frontier Airlines (entry Q3 2010).  
 
Backward multiple regression was conducted to determine which independent variables were the 
predictors of the fare behavior for the airlines with the Virgin America market entry (see 
Appendix D Table 24). Regression analysis indicates the overall model of three variables (stage 
length, WTI, and the number of economy passengers) that significantly predict fare behavior of 
airlines operating in the same market, R²=0.252, R²adj.= .245, F(3,301)= 33.876, p<.001.  The 
model accounts for 25% of variance in fares of airlines with the LCC Virgin America’s entry. 
Beta coefficients indicate that the airlines’ fares will increase with the increases in the stage 
length and the oil price, and decreases in the number of economy passengers. 
 
Frontier Airlines entry Q3 2010 
Airlines in operation in the same market:  American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, US Airways, and 
Virgin America (Q4 2011 entry).   
 
Backward multiple regression was conducted to determine which independent variables were the 
predictors of the fare behavior for the airlines with the Frontier Airlines’ market entry (see 
Appendix D Table 25). Regression analysis indicate an overall model of five variables (WTI, 
stage length,  # Pax Economy, number of stops, and number of competitors) that significantly 
predict fare behavior of airlines operating in the same market, R²=0.37, R²adj.= .359, F(5,277)= 
32.593, p<.001. The model accounts for 37% of variance in fares of airlines with the Frontier 
Airlines market entry. Beta coefficients indicate that the airlines’ fares will increase with an 
increase in the stage length, number of competitors and increase in the oil price. Fares will 
decrease with a decrease in the number of stops and the number of economy passengers. 
 
Portland International Airport, OR 
 
JetBlue Airways entry Q2 2006 
Airlines in operation in the same market:  Delta Air Lines, US Airways, and United Airlines. 
Southwest Airlines data was not available in the MasFlight database. 
 
Backward multiple regression was conducted to determine which independent variables were the 
predictors of the fare behavior for the airlines with the JetBlue Airways’ market entry (see 
Appendix E Table 26). Regression analysis indicates the overall model of five variables (WTI 
oil, number of stops, stage length, number of competitors and number of economy passengers) 
that significantly predict fare behavior of airlines operating in the same market, R²=0.235, 
R²adj.= 0.226, F(5,416)= 25.536, p<.001. The model accounts for almost 24% of variance in 
fares of major airlines with the LCC JetBlue Airways entry. Beta coefficients indicate that the 
airlines’ fares will increase with increases in the stage length and the oil price, and decreases in 
the number of economy passengers, number of stops and number of competitors. 
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Richmond International Airport, VA 
 
AirTran Airways entry Q2 2005 
Airlines in operation in the same market:  Delta Air Lines, US Airways, United Airlines and 
American Airlines.  
Backward multiple regression was conducted to determine which independent variables were the 
predictors of the fare behavior for the airlines with the AirTran Airways’ market entry (see 
Appendix F Table 27). Regression analysis indicate the overall model of two variables (stage 
length and the number of stops) that significantly predict fare behavior of airlines operating in 
the same market, R²=0.384, R²adj.= 0.380, F(2,364)= 113.297, p<.001. The model accounts for 
almost 38% of variance in fares of major airlines with the LCC AirTran Airways entry. Beta 
coefficients indicate that the airlines’ fares will increase with increases in the stage length and 
decreases in the number of stops. 
 
JetBlue Airways entry Q1 2006 
Airlines in operation in the same market:  Delta Air Lines, US Airways, United Airlines, 
American Airlines and AirTran Airways.  
 
Backward multiple regression was conducted to determine which independent variables were the 
predictors of the fare behavior for the airlines with the JetBlue Airways’ market entry (see 
Appendix F Table 28). Regression analysis indicate the overall model of only one variable (stage 
length) that significantly predict fare behavior of airlines operating in the same market, 
R²=0.226, R²adj.= 0.215, F(1,72)= 21.052, p<.001. The model accounts for almost 23% of 
variance in fares of major airlines with the LCC JetBlue Airways entry. Beta coefficients 
indicate that the airline’s fares will increase with an increase in the stage length.  
 
Sarasota Bradenton International Airport, FL 
 
JetBlue Airways entry Q4 2006 
Airlines in operation in the same market:  Delta Air Lines, US Airways, United Airlines, and 
American Airlines.  
 
Backward multiple regression was conducted to determine which independent variables were the 
predictors of the fare behavior for the airlines with the JetBlue Airways’ market entry (see 
Appendix G, Table 29). Regression analysis indicates the overall model of only one variable 
(number of stops) that predicts fare behavior of airlines operating in the same market. 
 
Westchester County Airport, NY 
 
AirTran Airways entry Q2 2006 
Airlines in operation in the same market:  Delta Air Lines, US Airways, and United Airlines, and 
American Airlines. Data for Cape Air was not available.  
 
Backward multiple regression was conducted to determine which independent variables were the 
predictors of the fare behavior for the airlines with the AirTran Airways’ market entry (see 
Appendix H, Table 30). Regression analysis indicates the overall model of three variables (WTI, 
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number of stops and the stage length) that significantly predict fare behavior of airlines operating 
in the same market, R²=0.103, R²adj.= 0.088, F(3,181)= 6.914, p<.001. The model accounts for 
almost 10% of variance in fares of major airlines with the AirTran Airways entry. Beta 
coefficients indicate that the airlines’ fares will increase with decreases in WTI, number of stops 
and the stage length.  
 
JetBlue Airways entry Q1 2007 
Airlines in operation in the same market:  Delta Air Lines, US Airways, and United Airlines. 
 
Backward multiple regression was conducted to determine which independent variables were the 
predictors of the fare behavior for the airlines with the JetBlue Airways’ market entry (see 
Appendix H, Table 31). Regression analysis indicates the overall model of only one variable 
(WTI), that significantly predict fare behavior of airlines operating in the same market, 
R²=0.280, R²adj.= 0.273, F(1,100)= 38.941, p<.001. The model accounts for almost 28% of 
variance in fares of major airlines with the JetBlue Airways entry. Beta coefficients indicate that 
the airlines’ fares will increase with a decrease in WTI. 
 
 
Discussion of the Stage 2 Results 
 
The second stage of the research had five propositions and investigated the effect of indicators 
(stage length, number of passengers in economy class, number of competitors, number of stops 
and price of oil) on the fares of airlines in the market with LCC entry. The overall results of the 
analyses are presented in Appendix I Table 32. 
 
Proposed Propositions: Fares of airlines will increase with 
 
1. An increase in the stage length (the longer the route, the higher the costs and the higher 
the fare). 
This proposition was supported. While most of the airlines had significant positive relations 
between the stage length and airfares (seven cases), airlines out of Westchester County 
Airport with Air Tran Airways entry displayed the opposite effect (the longer the route, the 
lower the fare). 
 
2. A decrease in the number of passengers in economy class (less passengers result in 
higher fares).  
This proposition was supported. Out of five cases of airlines flying from different airports 
who displayed significant relations between those two variable, all five were in support of 
this proposition. 
 
3. A decrease in the number of competitors in the market (less competitors results in higher 
fares).  
This proposition was supported. Out of three cases of airlines flying from different airports 
who displayed the significant relations, all three were in support of this proposition. 
 
4. A decrease in the number of stops (the fewer the stops, the higher the fare).  
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This proposition was supported. Out of four cases of airlines flying from different airport 
who displayed significant relations, all four were in support of this proposition. 
 
5. An increase in oil price (the higher the oil price, the higher the fare).  
There were mix results for this proposition. While four cases displayed positive relations, 
other four displayed the opposite effect. Prices of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil, 
which is used as a benchmark in oil pricing, is presented in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11 WTI Crude Oil Price (Dollars per Barrel) 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2015 
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CONCLUSIONS  
 
The competitive behavior of LCC entrants and incumbent airlines is a topic of interest for the 
industry and policy makers. Airlines can respond to the new entrant either with a price cut or 
capacity increase, not to maximize profits but to shut down the new competitor. The U.S. 
Department of Transportation has the guidelines for evaluating whether the airline behavior can 
be considered predatory. 
 
GAO (2014) stated that as transportation demand has increased, capacity restraint has resulted in 
higher airfares. For example, average one-way domestic fares excluding taxes or other fees 
increased approximately 9% from $184.92 in 2007 to $201.00 in 2012 for network airlines, and 
approximately 17% from $117.37 to $137.00 for low-cost airlines (GAO, 2014, p.16). Prior 
research has demonstrated the effect of airline competition on airfares. It has shown that the 
presence of an LCC in the market is associated with lower fares. However, LCCs started having 
less influence on fares. According to the GAO, “while low-cost airlines continue to offer lower 
fares on average than network airlines, recent trends suggest that the fare-reducing effect of entry 
by the largest low-cost airline in certain markets may be waning” (GAO, 2014).  
 
This paper focused on two main issues. First, it investigated airline behavior or competitive 
reaction by established airlines when they face an LCC entrant in the less congested, small-sized 
U.S. regional airports with only few airlines in operation. Second, it explained which of the 
selected market indicators were most likely to influence the airline fares out of small regional 
airports with the LCC entry. While the first stage of research demonstrated mix results and did 
not discovered any patterns in airline behavior with LCC entry due to a large number of other 
variables influencing airline revenue management, the second stage confirmed that the stage 
length, number of passengers, number of competitors, the number of stops and the oil price had 
an impact of airfares for airlines operating out of small regional airports. The surprising results of 
negative relations came from analysis of oil price and airline fares out of two airports: McGhee 
Tyson Airport with AirTran Airways entry, and Westchester County Airport with AirTran 
Airways and JetBlue Airways entry.  
 
Good decisions require that each decision-maker accurately predict the strategic moves of the 
other parties (McMillan, 2000).  The success of any company relies on its strategic decisions. 
This includes the interactions between managerial decision and decisions of other people. The 
aviation industry is very dynamic. How the LCC chooses which market to enter will depend on 
the barriers to entry, including the reaction of the established network carriers. Dealing with 
prospective LCC entrants is critical for global network carriers. LCCs tend to pursue growth 
through innovative business models including lower operating costs, which result in the 
reduction of air fares. This stimulates air travel demand by improving the affordability and 
accessibility of air travel in already established markets.  
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Appendix A 
Table 20 Airports Summary 
  Location 
Large City 
Population  
(2014)  
Metro 
Area 
1,000 
(2014) 
 Pax 
Movement 
1,000 (2012) 
 Pax 
Movement 
1,000 (2013) 
Airports within 200 miles  
McGhee Tyson 
Airport, TN 
12 miles 
from 
Knoxville, 
TN 
184,281 852 1,695 1,631 
Nashville International Airport (176 mi), 
Tri-Cities Regional Airport (100 mi), 
Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport (103 
mi) and Asheville Regional Airport, NC 
(123 mi). 
Newport 
News/Williamsb
urg Intern 
Airport, VA 
9 miles from 
Newport 
News, VA 
182,020 1,707 741 547 
Richmond International Airport (60 mi), 
Ronald Reagan Washington National 
Airport (169 mi), Washington Dulles 
International Airport (173 mi), Norfolk 
International Airport (28 mi), 
Charlottesville Albemarle Airport (146 
mi),  Pitt-Greenville Airport (153 mi), 
Salisbury-Ocean City Wicomico Regional 
Airport (154 mi) and Coastal Carolina 
Regional Airport (177 mi).  
Palm Spring 
International 
Airport, CA 
2 miles from 
downtown 
Palm 
Springs, CA 
46,854 2,329 1,469 1,518 
 LA/Ontario International Airport (72 mi), 
John Wayne Airport (100 mi), San Diego 
International Airport (145 mi), Imperial 
County Airport (102 mi), Long Beach 
Airport (114 mi), and McClellan-Palomar 
Airport (117 mi). 
Portland 
International 
Airport, OR 
12 miles of 
downtown 
Portland, OR 
619,360 2,314 13,621 14,215 
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (162 
mi), Kenmore Air Harbor Seaplane Base 
(175 mi), Eugene Airport (130 mi), 
Roberts Field (144 mi) and King County 
International Airport (167 mi).  
Richmond 
International 
Airport, VA 
Sandston, 
VA and 
Richmond, 
VA  
214,853 
1,260 
Richm
ond 
VA 
Metro 
Area 
3,122 3,136 
Ronald Reagan Washington National 
Airport (115 mi), Washington Dulles 
International Airport (119 mi), 
Baltimore/Washington International 
Thurgood Marshall Airport (149 mi), 
Raleigh-Durham International Airport 
(161 mi),  Newport News/Williamsburg 
International Airport (60 mi), 
Charlottesville Albemarle Airport (87 mi) 
and Norfolk International Airport (87 mi). 
Sarasota 
Bradenton 
International 
Airport, FL 
Sarasota, 3 
miles and 
Bradenton, 
FL 6 miles  
 Sarasota 
54,214 & 
Bradenton 
52,769  
390 1,283 1,133 
Tampa International Airport (51 mi), 
Southwest Florida International Airport 
(93 mi), Orlando International Airport 
(125 mi), Orlando Sanford International 
Airport (156 mi), St. Petersburg-
Clearwater International Airport (43 mi), 
Charlotte County Airport (63 mi), and 
Naples Municipal Airport (121 mi). 
Westchester 
County Airport, 
NY 
5 miles of 
White Plains 
NY and 30 
miles of New 
York 
58,035 
White Plains 
23,484
New 
York 
Metro 
Area 
1,830 1,496 
LaGuardia Airport (31 mi), John F. 
Kennedy International Airport (38 mi), 
Newark Liberty International Airport (48 
mi), Bradley International Airport (97 mi), 
Teterboro Airport (36 mi), Tweed New 
Haven Regional Airport (55 mi), Stewart 
International Airport (62 mi), Morristown 
Municipal Airport (65 mi) and Long 
Island MacArthur Airport( 67 mi) 
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Appendix B: McGhee Tyson Airport, TN 
 
Table 21 Frontier Airlines entry  
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .323a .105 .094 58.60973 
2 .323b .104 .096 58.54256 
3 .321c .103 .097 58.50989 
a. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, Stage Length, # Pax Economy , # Competitors domest. market, # Stops 
b. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, Stage Length, # Pax Economy , # Competitors domest. market 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Stage Length, # Pax Economy , # Competitors domest. market 
 
 
ANOVAd 
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 162568.186 5 32513.637 9.465 .000a 
Residual 1391215.600 405 3435.100   
Total 1553783.786 410    
2 Regression 162327.786 4 40581.946 11.841 .000b 
Residual 1391456.000 406 3427.232   
Total 1553783.786 410    
3 Regression 160457.277 3 53485.759 15.624 .000c 
Residual 1393326.509 407 3423.407   
Total 1553783.786 410    
a. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, Stage Length, # Pax Economy , # Competitors domest. market, # Stops 
b. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, Stage Length, # Pax Economy , # Competitors domest. market 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Stage Length, # Pax Economy , # Competitors domest. market 
d. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
 
Coefficientsa 
     
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 268.922 43.170  6.229 .000 
Stage Length .019 .007 .144 2.642 .009 
# Stops 5.082 19.211 .015 .265 .791 
# Pax Economy  -.022 .006 -.218 -3.703 .000 
# Competitors domest. market -10.334 8.300 -.072 -1.245 .214 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-.303 .412 -.042 -.735 .463 
2 (Constant) 273.784 39.017  7.017 .000 
Stage Length .020 .007 .148 2.837 .005 
# Pax Economy  -.022 .005 -.224 -4.250 .000 
# Competitors domest. market -10.498 8.267 -.073 -1.270 .205 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-.304 .412 -.042 -.739 .460 
3 (Constant) 262.247 35.736  7.339 .000 
Stage Length .020 .007 .151 2.894 .004 
# Pax Economy  -.022 .005 -.225 -4.266 .000 
# Competitors domest. market -13.946 6.819 -.097 -2.045 .041 
a. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
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Table 22 AirTran Airways entry 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .855a .731 .677 26.86822 
2 .843b .711 .669 27.18914 
a. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Pax Economy , # Competitors domest. market, Stage Length 
b. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Pax Economy , # Competitors domest. market 
 
ANOVAc 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 39233.564 4 9808.391 13.587 .000a 
Residual 14438.024 20 721.901   
Total 53671.588 24    
2 Regression 38147.355 3 12715.785 17.201 .000b 
Residual 15524.233 21 739.249   
Total 53671.588 24    
a. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Pax Economy , # Competitors domest. market, Stage Length 
b. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Pax Economy , # Competitors domest. market 
c. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 623.930 64.595  9.659 .000 
Stage Length -.034 .028 -.187 -1.227 .234 
# Pax Economy  -.054 .023 -.343 -2.310 .032 
# Competitors domest. market -78.898 12.744 -.727 -6.191 .000 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-.571 .293 -.232 -1.948 .066 
2 (Constant) 607.491 63.944  9.500 .000 
# Pax Economy  -.036 .019 -.230 -1.952 .064 
# Competitors domest. market -81.078 12.770 -.747 -6.349 .000 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-.648 .290 -.263 -2.235 .036 
a. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
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Appendix C: Newport News/Williamsburg International Airport, VA 
Table 23 Frontier Airlines entry 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .352a .124 .112 72.89109 
2 .343b .118 .109 73.02961 
3 .331c .110 .104 73.23199 
a. Predictors: (Constant), WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, Stage Length, # Stops, # Competitors domest. market 
b. Predictors: (Constant), WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, Stage Length, # Stops 
c. Predictors: (Constant), WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, Stage Length 
ANOVAd 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 226800.203 4 56700.051 10.672 .000a 
Residual 1604559.488 302 5313.111   
Total 1831359.691 306    
2 Regression 215362.632 3 71787.544 13.460 .000b 
Residual 1615997.059 303 5333.324   
Total 1831359.691 306    
3 Regression 201030.718 2 100515.359 18.743 .000c 
Residual 1630328.973 304 5362.924   
Total 1831359.691 306    
a. Predictors: (Constant), WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, Stage Length, # Stops, # Competitors domest. market 
b. Predictors: (Constant), WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, Stage Length, # Stops 
c. Predictors: (Constant), WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, Stage Length 
d. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -9.025 44.126  -.205 .838 
Stage Length .043 .010 .246 4.458 .000 
# Stops 24.878 14.242 .097 1.747 .082 
# Competitors domest. market -18.905 12.885 -.120 -1.467 .143 
WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
2.253 .617 .298 3.652 .000 
2 (Constant) -.111 43.789  -.003 .998 
Stage Length .043 .010 .249 4.518 .000 
# Stops 23.327 14.230 .090 1.639 .102 
WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
1.574 .409 .208 3.851 .000 
3 (Constant) 19.818 42.184  .470 .639 
Stage Length .046 .009 .268 4.945 .000 
WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
1.544 .410 .204 3.771 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
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Appendix D: Palm Spring International Airport, CA 
 
Table 24 Virgin America entry 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .454a .206 .204 57.86428 
2 .490b .241 .236 56.69079 
3 .502c .252 .245 56.34004 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Stage Length 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Stage Length,  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Stage Length,  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Pax Economy  
 
ANOVAd 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 263496.559 1 263496.559 78.696 .000a 
Residual 1014527.431 303 3348.275   
Total 1278023.990 304    
2 Regression 307442.724 2 153721.362 47.831 .000b 
Residual 970581.266 302 3213.845   
Total 1278023.990 304    
3 Regression 322589.639 3 107529.880 33.876 .000c 
Residual 955434.350 301 3174.200   
Total 1278023.990 304    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Stage Length 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Stage Length,  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Stage Length,  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Pax Economy  
d. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 125.768 9.780  12.860 .000 
Stage Length .049 .006 .454 8.871 .000 
2 (Constant) 20.668 29.994  .689 .491 
Stage Length .050 .005 .462 9.208 .000 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
1.163 .314 .186 3.698 .000 
3 (Constant) 22.449 29.819  .753 .452 
Stage Length .047 .006 .435 8.469 .000 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
1.224 .314 .195 3.902 .000 
# Pax Economy  -.002 .001 -.113 -2.184 .030 
a. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
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Table 25 Frontier Airlines entry 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .609a .370 .359 56.28494 
a. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, Stage Length, # Pax Economy , # Stops, # Competitors domest. market 
 
 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 516278.428 5 103255.686 32.593 .000a 
Residual 877534.598 277 3167.995   
Total 1393813.026 282    
a. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, Stage Length, # Pax Economy , # Stops, # Competitors domest. market 
b. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -29.001 36.376  -.797 .426 
Stage Length .057 .006 .549 10.329 .000 
# Stops -20.333 10.898 -.111 -1.866 .063 
# Pax Economy  -.003 .001 -.167 -3.015 .003 
# Competitors domest. market 17.809 8.464 .125 2.104 .036 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
.979 .402 .145 2.438 .015 
a. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
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Appendix E: Portland International Airport, OR 
 
Table 26 JetBlue Airways entry 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .485a .235 .226 41.92108 
a. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Stops, Stage Length, # Competitors domest. market, # Pax Economy  
 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 224382.618 5 44876.524 25.536 .000a 
Residual 731068.949 416 1757.377   
Total 955451.567 421    
a. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Stops, Stage Length, # Competitors domest. market, # Pax Economy  
b. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 202.701 24.550  8.257 .000 
Stage Length .030 .003 .415 9.213 .000 
# Stops -79.096 18.034 -.227 -4.386 .000 
# Pax Economy  -.012 .005 -.144 -2.741 .006 
# Competitors domest. market -18.118 5.251 -.177 -3.450 .001 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
.741 .193 .190 3.837 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
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Appendix F: Richmond International Airport, VA 
 
Table 27 AirTran Airways entry 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .622a .387 .378 32.23715 
2 .621b .386 .379 32.21393 
3 .621c .385 .380 32.19246 
4 .619d .384 .380 32.19035 
a. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Pax Economy , Stage Length, # Stops, # Competitors domest. market 
b. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Pax Economy , Stage Length, # Stops 
c. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, Stage Length, # Stops 
d. Predictors: (Constant), Stage Length, # Stops 
 
ANOVAe 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 236820.922 5 47364.184 45.576 .000a 
Residual 375163.431 361 1039.234   
Total 611984.353 366    
2 Regression 236323.549 4 59080.887 56.932 .000b 
Residual 375660.804 362 1037.737   
Total 611984.353 366    
3 Regression 235787.622 3 78595.874 75.839 .000c 
Residual 376196.731 363 1036.355   
Total 611984.353 366    
4 Regression 234800.854 2 117400.427 113.297 .000d 
Residual 377183.499 364 1036.218   
Total 611984.353 366    
a. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Pax Economy , Stage Length, # Stops, # Competitors domest. market 
b. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Pax Economy , Stage Length, # Stops 
c. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, Stage Length, # Stops 
d. Predictors: (Constant), Stage Length, # Stops 
e. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 151.301 19.009  7.959 .000 
Stage Length .042 .003 .667 14.984 .000 
# Stops -27.660 7.539 -.224 -3.669 .000 
# Pax Economy  -.001 .001 -.042 -.710 .478 
# Competitors domest. market 4.529 6.546 .054 .692 .490 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-.353 .331 -.083 -1.065 .287 
2 (Constant) 161.601 11.811  13.682 .000 
Stage Length .042 .003 .666 14.980 .000 
# Stops -27.750 7.533 -.225 -3.684 .000 
# Pax Economy  -.001 .001 -.043 -.719 .473 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-.159 .176 -.038 -.901 .368 
3 (Constant) 157.963 10.664  14.812 .000 
Stage Length .042 .003 .667 15.034 .000 
# Stops -24.012 5.444 -.195 -4.411 .000 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-.171 .176 -.040 -.976 .330 
40 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .622a .387 .378 32.23715 
2 .621b .386 .379 32.21393 
3 .621c .385 .380 32.19246 
4 .619d .384 .380 32.19035 
4 (Constant) 148.819 5.090  29.240 .000 
Stage Length .042 .003 .663 15.014 .000 
# Stops -24.054 5.443 -.195 -4.419 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
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Table 28 JetBlue Airways entry 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .502a .252 .197 37.22761 
2 .502b .252 .209 36.95913 
3 .501c .251 .219 36.72239 
4 .492d .242 .221 36.66923 
5 .476e .226 .215 36.80070 
a. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Pax Economy , Stage Length, # Stops, # Competitors domest. market 
b. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Pax Economy , Stage Length, # Stops 
c. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Pax Economy , Stage Length 
d. Predictors: (Constant), # Pax Economy , Stage Length 
e. Predictors: (Constant), Stage Length 
 
ANOVAf 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 31778.179 5 6355.636 4.586 .001a 
Residual 94240.837 68 1385.895   
Total 126019.016 73    
2 Regression 31766.605 4 7941.651 5.814 .000b 
Residual 94252.411 69 1365.977   
Total 126019.016 73    
3 Regression 31621.625 3 10540.542 7.816 .000c 
Residual 94397.391 70 1348.534   
Total 126019.016 73    
4 Regression 30550.126 2 15275.063 11.360 .000d 
Residual 95468.890 71 1344.632   
Total 126019.016 73    
5 Regression 28510.039 1 28510.039 21.052 .000e 
Residual 97508.977 72 1354.291   
Total 126019.016 73    
a. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Pax Economy , Stage Length, # Stops, # Competitors domest. market 
b. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Pax Economy , Stage Length, # Stops 
c. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Pax Economy , Stage Length 
d. Predictors: (Constant), # Pax Economy , Stage Length 
e. Predictors: (Constant), Stage Length 
f. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 146.880 41.513  3.538 .001 
Stage Length .035 .008 .483 4.141 .000 
# Stops 3.757 11.698 .043 .321 .749 
# Pax Economy  .002 .002 .145 1.155 .252 
# Competitors domest. market 1.012 11.078 .012 .091 .927 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-.445 .573 -.104 -.776 .441 
2 (Constant) 149.420 30.607  4.882 .000 
Stage Length .035 .008 .484 4.190 .000 
# Stops 3.782 11.610 .043 .326 .746 
# Pax Economy  .002 .002 .144 1.160 .250 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-.413 .450 -.097 -.916 .363 
3 (Constant) 150.728 30.149  4.999 .000 
Stage Length .036 .008 .497 4.600 .000 
# Pax Economy  .002 .002 .124 1.154 .252 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-.396 .445 -.093 -.891 .376 
4 (Constant) 125.149 9.235  13.551 .000 
Stage Length .036 .008 .510 4.767 .000 
# Pax Economy  .002 .002 .132 1.232 .222 
5 (Constant) 131.144 7.877  16.649 .000 
Stage Length .034 .007 .476 4.588 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
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Appendix G: Sarasota Bradenton International Airport, FL 
 
Table 29 JetBlue Airways entry 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .148a .022 -.044 81.93407 
2 .148b .022 -.030 81.38695 
3 .142c .020 -.019 80.93122 
4 .131d .017 -.008 80.51951 
5 .097e .009 -.003 80.31936 
6 .000f .000 .000 80.18741 
 
ANOVAg 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 11195.409 5 2239.082 .334 .891a 
Residual 496776.226 74 6713.192   
Total 507971.635 79    
2 Regression 11183.912 4 2795.978 .422 .792b 
Residual 496787.723 75 6623.836   
Total 507971.635 79    
3 Regression 10182.104 3 3394.035 .518 .671c 
Residual 497789.531 76 6549.862   
Total 507971.635 79    
4 Regression 8750.532 2 4375.266 .675 .512d 
Residual 499221.103 77 6483.391   
Total 507971.635 79    
5 Regression 4778.011 1 4778.011 .741 .392e 
Residual 503193.624 78 6451.200   
Total 507971.635 79    
6 Regression .000 0 .000 . .f 
Residual 507971.635 79 6430.021   
Total 507971.635 79    
a. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, Stage Length, # Pax Economy , # Competitors domest. market, # Stops 
b. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Pax Economy , # Competitors domest. market, # Stops 
c. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Competitors domest. market, # Stops 
d. Predictors: (Constant), # Competitors domest. market, # Stops 
e. Predictors: (Constant), # Stops 
f. Predictor: (constant) 
g. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 99.151 122.938  .807 .423 
Stage Length -.003 .071 -.005 -.041 .967 
# Stops 27.019 39.779 .085 .679 .499 
# Pax Economy  -.011 .029 -.046 -.383 .703 
# Competitors domest. market 17.480 22.417 .097 .780 .438 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-.242 .495 -.061 -.489 .626 
2 (Constant) 96.014 96.140  .999 .321 
# Stops 26.513 37.605 .083 .705 .483 
# Pax Economy  -.011 .028 -.047 -.389 .698 
# Competitors domest. market 17.569 22.165 .097 .793 .430 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-.246 .484 -.062 -.509 .612 
3 (Constant) 81.076 87.639  .925 .358 
# Stops 29.578 36.564 .093 .809 .421 
# Competitors domest. market 19.178 21.653 .106 .886 .379 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-.223 .477 -.056 -.468 .641 
4 (Constant) 73.838 85.822  .860 .392 
# Stops 31.795 36.071 .100 .881 .381 
# Competitors domest. market 16.023 20.469 .088 .783 .436 
5 (Constant) 134.556 36.633  3.673 .000 
# Stops 30.952 35.965 .097 .861 .392 
6 (Constant) 165.121 8.965  18.418 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
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Appendix H: Westchester County Airport, NY 
Table 30 AirTran Airways entry 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .321a .103 .078 43.64968 
2 .321b .103 .083 43.53152 
3 .321c .103 .088 43.41678 
a. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Stops, Stage Length, # Competitors domest. market, # Pax Economy  
b. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Stops, Stage Length, # Competitors domest. market 
c. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Stops, Stage Length 
ANOVAd 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 39240.778 5 7848.156 4.119 .001a 
Residual 341047.767 179 1905.295   
Total 380288.545 184    
2 Regression 39189.711 4 9797.428 5.170 .001b 
Residual 341098.834 180 1894.994   
Total 380288.545 184    
3 Regression 39100.507 3 13033.502 6.914 .000c 
Residual 341188.038 181 1885.017   
Total 380288.545 184    
a. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Stops, Stage Length, # Competitors domest. market, # Pax Economy  
b. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Stops, Stage Length, # Competitors domest. market 
c. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Stops, Stage Length 
d. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 247.273 40.446  6.114 .000 
Stage Length -.033 .019 -.147 -1.775 .078 
# Stops -37.836 18.196 -.206 -2.079 .039 
# Pax Economy  -.009 .057 -.017 -.164 .870 
# Competitors domest. market 1.785 7.610 .019 .235 .815 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-.542 .277 -.157 -1.960 .052 
2 (Constant) 244.386 36.300  6.732 .000 
Stage Length -.032 .018 -.143 -1.819 .071 
# Stops -36.037 14.466 -.196 -2.491 .014 
# Competitors domest. market 1.635 7.534 .017 .217 .828 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-.544 .276 -.158 -1.973 .050 
3 (Constant) 250.007 25.357  9.860 .000 
Stage Length -.032 .018 -.143 -1.818 .071 
# Stops -36.097 14.425 -.196 -2.502 .013 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-.516 .243 -.150 -2.123 .035 
a. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
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Table 31 JetBlue Airways entry 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .541a .292 .263 42.97654 
2 .541b .292 .270 42.75674 
3 .539c .290 .276 42.58979 
4 .529d .280 .273 42.68060 
a. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, Stage Length, # Competitors domest. market, # Pax Economy  
b. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, Stage Length, # Pax Economy  
c. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Pax Economy  
d. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
 
ANOVAe 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 73941.654 4 18485.413 10.008 .000a 
Residual 179157.377 97 1846.983   
Total 253099.031 101    
2 Regression 73941.431 3 24647.144 13.482 .000b 
Residual 179157.600 98 1828.139   
Total 253099.031 101    
3 Regression 73523.860 2 36761.930 20.267 .000c 
Residual 179575.170 99 1813.891   
Total 253099.031 101    
4 Regression 70935.687 1 70935.687 38.941 .000d 
Residual 182163.343 100 1821.633   
Total 253099.031 101    
a. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, Stage Length, # Competitors domest. market, # Pax Economy  
b. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, Stage Length, # Pax Economy  
c. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
, # Pax Economy  
d. Predictors: (Constant),  WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
e. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 238.587 64.297  3.711 .000 
Stage Length -.017 .036 -.045 -.472 .638 
# Pax Economy  .074 .081 .089 .917 .361 
# Competitors domest. market -.104 9.473 -.001 -.011 .991 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-1.283 .251 -.492 -5.108 .000 
2 (Constant) 238.102 46.494  5.121 .000 
Stage Length -.017 .035 -.045 -.478 .634 
# Pax Economy  .074 .079 .090 .936 .352 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-1.284 .235 -.492 -5.475 .000 
3 (Constant) 218.280 20.931  10.429 .000 
# Pax Economy  .088 .074 .106 1.195 .235 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-1.298 .232 -.497 -5.602 .000 
4 (Constant) 232.927 16.999  13.702 .000 
 WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
-1.382 .221 -.529 -6.240 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Fare Avg. Economy (ow) 
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Appendix I 
Table 31 Stage 2 Overall Results: Airline Fares Increase 
Airport 
LCC 
Entry 
Other 
Airlines 
 
Stage 
Length 
# 
Pax 
econ. 
# 
Comp. 
# 
Stops 
WTI Beta Coefficients 
McGhee 
Tyson 
Airport, TN 
Frontier 
Airlines 
DL, 
US,AA, 
UA, 
AirTran 
R²=0.103 + - -   
Airlines' fares will increase 
with an increase in the stage 
length, and decreases in the 
number of competitors on 
the market and number of 
passenger in economy class. 
McGhee 
Tyson 
Airport, TN 
AirTran 
Airways  
DL, US, 
US 
R²=0.711  - -  - 
Airlines' fares will increase 
with decreases in number of 
passengers, number of 
competitors in the market, 
and the oil price. 
Newport 
News, VA 
Frontier 
Airlines  
DL, US, 
UA 
R²=0.110 +    + 
 Airlines' fares will increase 
with increases in the oil price 
and the stage length. 
Palm Spring 
International 
Airport, CA 
Virgin 
America  
AA, 
DL, US, 
Frontier 
R²=0.252 + -   + 
Airlines' fares will increase 
with the increases in the 
stage length and the oil 
price, and decreases in the 
number of economy 
passengers 
Palm Spring 
International 
Airport, CA 
Frontier 
Airlines  
AA, 
DL, US, 
Virgin 
R²=0.37 + -  - + 
Airlines' fares will increase 
with increases in the stage 
length and the oil price. 
Fares will decrease with 
decreases in the number of 
stops and the number of 
economy passengers. 
Portland 
International 
Airport, OR 
JetBlue 
Airways  
DL, US, 
US 
R²=0.235 + - - - + 
Airline' fares will increase 
with increases in the stage 
length and the oil price, and 
decreases in the number of 
economy passengers, 
number of stops and number 
of competitors. 
Richmond 
International 
Airport, VA 
AirTran 
Airways  
DL, US, 
US, AA 
R²=0.384 +   -  
Airlines' fares will increase 
with increases in the stage 
length and decreases in the 
number of stops. 
Richmond 
International 
Airport, VA 
JetBlue 
Airways  
DL, US, 
UA, 
AA, 
AirTran 
R²=0.226 +     
 Airlines' fares will increase 
with increases in the stage 
length.  
Westchester 
County 
Airport, NY 
AirTran 
Airways  
DL, US, 
UA, AA 
R²=0.103 -   - - 
Airlines' fares will increase 
with decreases in the oil 
price, number of stops and 
the stage length.  
Westchester 
County 
Airport, NY 
JetBlue 
Airways  
DL, US, 
UA 
R²=0.280     - 
Airlines' fares will increase 
with decreases in the oil 
price. 
 
Sarasota Bradenton International Airport did not display the significant relations between the studies variables. 
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